Financial accounting standards in the U.S. are developed by private standard setting organizations (SSOs) that operate under the oversight of a government agency. The primary accounting SSO (FASB) has been criticized for writing too many standards (standards overload), the complexity of its standards, the processes by which its standards are set, and the absence of a competitive mechanism to help set standards. The present study seeks to assess the validity of these concerns by looking at standard setting processes in the broader economy.
Introduction
One of the most salient features of the recent history of financial reporting is the formal standardization of accounting (Baxter [1953] ). After the passage of the U.S. federal security laws in 1933-34, financial reporting has been characterized by sustained movement toward written standards, and away from social norms (Sunder [2005a, b] ). A large body of research attempts to assess accounting and its standardization within its own domain. However, standards are not peculiar to accounting, and are used widely in virtually all aspects of modern economies to serve a variety of purposes (Cheit [1990] ). In order to better understand this seven-decade long trend toward standardization of accounting, it is useful to examine it in the context of the extent, role and processes of standardization in the economy at large 1 . This paper is a tentative attempt in this direction.
In the economy at large, standardization activities are carried out by government departments and agencies, as well as outside the government hierarchy by professional, industry, cooperative and not-for-profit organizations (to which we apply the label "private" in contradistinction to "government"). Private standard setting is often conducted with the support, cooperation or supervision of government agencies. The setting of accounting standards in U.S. and Europe remains in "private" hands in this sense. We discuss the implications of this assignment of responsibility for 3 accounting standards in light of experience with how standard setting activities are organized in the larger economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical evidence on the timing and rate of formation of standard setting bodies, the number of standards issued by private and public sector standard setters in the economy, and a comparison of the length and complexity of FASB's accounting standards with the engineering standards set by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Section 3 develops a framework which distinguishes between quality and co-ordination standards. The framework also relates the use of monopoly and competitive forms of organizations in standard setting
to the underlying quality and co-ordination functions of their standards. Evidence on standard setting activities in the government is summarized. We also compare the processes used to set standards in accounting and in four technology oriented SSOs . Section 4 focuses on standards competition and presents data on how many standard setting bodies are involved in each industry in the economy, and a case study of standards competition in internet telephony. Finally, Section 5 examines some implications of our findings for accounting standard setting and regulation.
A Historical Perspective on Standard Setting

Formation of Standard Setting Bodies
Modern economies are characterized by extensive use of standards set by public and private standard setting bodies that cover a wide range of goods and services produced in the economy (Brunsson [2002] , Castells [1996] , Cheit [1990] ). Standard setting and certification (see Jamal and Sunder [2007] ) are pervasive in the economy. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducts periodic surveys of government and private sector SSOs in the U.S., and tabulates their activities (Martino [1941] ; Booth [1960] ; Hartman [1967] ; Chumas[1975] ; Toth [1984] ; Toth [1991] and Toth [1996b] . The most recent ([1996] ) edition of "Standards Activities of Organizations in the United States" reports the standards related activities of 684 organizations (80 governments and 4 604 non-governments) in the U.S. To prepare the 1996 version of this directory, 100 federal government agencies, and 1,200 private sector organizations were invited to participate in the study.
Formation of government and private SSOs in each of the past 13 decades is shown in Figure 1 .
Government SSOs started being formed soon after the creation of the Union and there were already 12 such bodies in existence prior to 1878 (e.g., the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (formed in 1789), the U.S. Mint and U.S. Customs (both formed in 1792). The private sector was slower in organizing standard setting organizations and there were only 3 private standard setting bodies in existence prior to 1878 (U.S. Pharmacopeia founded in 1820, Bureau of Shipping in 1862 and
American Association of Nurserymen in 1876).
The formation of private sector standard setters peaked in the 1930s with 97 new private standard setting organizations created in the New Deal era. There has been a steady decline in formation of new private standard setting organizations in the last six decades with only 10 new private standard setting bodies formed in the 1990s. Formation of government SSOs appears to follow a generational cycle with spikes in the decades of 1900 -1910 (12 new SSOs formed), 1930 -1939 (15 new SSOs), and 1970 -1979 . Glaeser and Shleifer ([2003] ) suggest that government regulation of business activity had a noticeable growth spurt during the first decade of the 1900s (the progressive era) due to the passage of the Pure Foods and Drug Act in 1906. This act brought food, drugs, and medicines under federal government's regulatory control. This act also led to federal inspection of meat in the United States. Banks (Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913) also came under government regulation during this period. Cheit ([1990] ) has proposed that private standard setting is proactive and tends to anticipate problems, whereas government standard setting tends to be reactive, and follows a well publicised crisis in an activity.
In accounting, there is a tendency to focus on the Securities laws of 1933 and 1934 as major legislative events that changed the regulation of business. The historical record indicates a major spurt of both government and non-government standardization and regulation from 1900 to the 1950s with a peak level of activity in the 1930s of which securities regulation was a part. In the 1930s government bodies were formed to regulate agricultural products, occupational health and safety, housing and health and human services (as well as the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934). In the private sector there was also rapid formation of standard setting organizations focusing on grains, scientific testing, adhesives, air transport, plastics and paediatrics. There was also a spike in formation of government standard setting bodies during the 1970s with extensive environmental, mining and transportation safety regulation. Likewise, the private sector formed new standard setting organizations focused on construction materials, bar coding, publishing, furniture and accounting standard setting in the 1970s.
A spike in formation of standard setting bodies over a 30-40 year period suggests a generational effect on regulation. Each new generation appears to spark a new demand for SSOs in both the public and private sector. Given this trend, perhaps we should not be surprised if the current decade brings another spike of which PCAOB could be a part. There is also considerable variation across countries
in terms of what activities are regulated in the private as opposed to the public sector. Many activities that are regulated by the public sector in the U.S. are regulated by the private sector in other countries (e.g., Sweden), and vice versa. While we are not aware of any direct large sample comparison, Cheit ([1990] ) uses this natural variation across countries to do four case studies of safety related SSOs. Two of the activities are regulated by the public (private) sector in the U.S. (Sweden), and two are regulated by the private (public) sector in the U.S. (Sweden). Cheit ([1990] ) documents differences in responsiveness of these bodies to pressure from private industry and political processes, but was unable to find a systematic effect on the nature of the actual standards set.
Number of Standards Set by Government and Private Standard Setters
The total number of U.S. government standards has been rising steadily from about 39,500 standards in 1967, to 52,500 in 1991 (see Table 1 ). During the 1990s, there was a concerted effort to reduce government standards (Toth [1996a] ). The U.S. government adopted a strategy of increasing 6 reliance on private standard setting. By 1996, this policy change led to a decline in government standards to 44,000. This decline was offset by an increase in private standards from 14,000 in 1967 to 49,000 in 1996. In 1996, for the first time, the number of private standards exceeded the number of standards set by the government (Toth [1996b] Table 2 . Table 2 shows that as of 1996, the largest source of non-government standards was the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). ASTM began issuing standards in 1898 and had issued 9,900 standards as of 1996. The well-known organization, Underwriters Laboratory (UL), #11th on the list was founded in 1894 and had issued 780 standards as of 1996. The American Petroleum Institute (founded 1919) was #15 on the list having issued 500 standards as of 1996. By comparison, the FASB had issued 127 standards as of 1996.
Standards Overload
Complaints about standards overload and responses by FASB claiming to deal with such overload are common in accounting. These complaints are about the volume of standards, excessive levels of complexity, and excessive level of detail in accounting standards (Seidler 1990; FASB 7 2002) 2 . Yet the data presented in Section 2.2 indicate that accounting standard setters are relatively small players in the world of private standards that dominate the economy. Could these complaints be without substance, and simply be rhetorical devices to argue against specific standards? There is no generally accepted method of assessing the correct level of standardization in accounting. In order to begin a discussion about standards overload, we decided to compare the FASB to other professional bodies to look at number of standards issued as well as the complexity of standards.
As an initial step, we chose four criteria to compare FASB standards with standards set in another professional field by the Internet Engineering Task Panel B of Figure 2 compares the complexity of standards issued by FASB and IETF. We used a Flesch-Kincaide index (Flesch [1948] , Kincaid et al., [1975] This first cut on preliminary data suggests that the rhetoric of standards overload in accounting may be overstated. It is possible that the complaints about standards overload are in reality complaints about the content, not the number or complexity of accounting standards. On the other hand, it is surprising to find that accounting standards are more complex (and a lot longer) than internet engineering standards. Perhaps these initial measures will stimulate more thought about how to assess and compare the quality of work of standard setting organizations.
Framework: Properties of Standards and The Processes By Which They are Developed
Quality Standards
There are good economic rationales, as well as limits, for standards. The same basic arguments apply to accounting as well as other industries. 4 Quality and coordination are two salient functions of standards. Quality standards take the form of specified minima for each attribute of each product category. Such standards can be used when the buyers' preference changes monotonically in the value 9 of the attribute in one direction (and in most cases, the cost to the seller changes monotonically in the other direction). Accordingly, from the buyer's point of view, quality standards help ensure minimum quality of products or services, while from the seller's point of view, they help determine the maximum cost to meeting the buyer expectations of the product or service. 5 Once the quality standard has been specified, people engaged in transactions can use them as a guide for their own decisions, minimizing the cost of communication and the chances of miscommunication.
Quality standards are motivated by concerns that some producers would be motivated to lower quality. This fear becomes real when the quality is not readily observable to the customer, and special effort or cost must be incurred to assess the quality of output. In such situations, as Akerlof ([1970]) suggested, competition among sellers for customers' dollars tends to lower the quality as well as the price of the output, and in extreme cases, ultimate collapse of the market into a "market for lemons." In such situations, it may be advantageous to all, producers as well as customers (subject to limitations of cost), to define and enforce quality standards, possibly by establishing a system of ratings or certification that facilitate transactions by minimizing the asymmetry of quality information between buyers and sellers.
Quality standards can be generally identified as those which order output by quality. Percent of foreign material or impurities, strength, probability of failure, chances of defect, smoothness, are examples of characteristics that may be used to define quality standards, depending on the context. With all things being equal, higher quality is always desirable for the consumers, and usually results in higher cost for the seller. Selection of quality standards is a matter of trading off the costs and benefits of higher quality. Consequently, such standards can take the form of minimum quality; leaving producers free to choose a higher level if they so wish. They can also take the form of grading standards, which defines two or more classes ranked by grade, each with a minimum standard of its own (see Jamal and Sunder [2007] for a discussion of grading standards in the private and public sector). The conceptual framework can be considered to be a tool devised to help accounting standard setters to construct and assess quality standards.
Coordination Standards
Even when the preferences of the transacting parties are not monotonic in the relevant attributes of the products and services, they may still need to coordinate on these attributes in order to obtain satisfactory results. The base diameter, the pitch and the shape of threading on the base of an electric bulb must match the design of the bulb sockets for either component to be of any use. Here the key issue is coordination not quality. A small change in diameter, for example, is no more or less desirable to the buyer or the seller, as long as the two parts fit together. These standards, too, reduce the cost of communication and transactions by making it easier for all parties to find satisfactory counterparties.
As can be seen in the example of a coordination standard (see Figure 3 for an example-unified thread standard from American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American National Standards Institute), the relevant attributes are not necessarily more or less desirable (in contrast to quality standards example given earlier where the attributes are directional). Coordination standards, which are intended to obtain a mutual fit among various actions or components for the sake of enhanced efficiency (between threads on screws and bolts in our example). There is no obvious way of ranking alternative coordination standards. Driving on the left or right hand side of the road, the distance between rails of a railroad track, the shape and pitch of the threads on a bolt or nut, collar sizes of shirts, the diameter of the base of screw-in electrical lamps, are all examples of coordination standards. They simply make life easier for the makers and users of products and services. Such standards are more likely to be created in the private sector. The argument for consistency and comparability, as well as the attempt to create a uniform definition of assets and liabilities, are like co-ordination standards in the private sector. These standards are not justified as being better on some quality dimension; they are appeals to co-ordination only. The broad umbrella of regulation can be said to cover both quality as well as coordination standards created by government agencies or private standard-setting bodies.
Monopoly and Competitive Standard Setting
Whether the SSOs, and their standards, have a monopoly or have to compete for the allegiance of users have important consequences for the economy. We examine these consequences, and the circumstances that are likely to give rise to monopoly versus competitive standards regimes before turning to a discussion of the conditions prevailing in the accounting domain.
A monopoly standards regime has the obvious advantage of better coordination; it is also more efficient in the short run. Standardizing all driving on the right (or left) side of the road in an entire country or continent is an obvious example of gains that can be obtained from coordination. Since there are no differences in efficiency, once chosen, the fixed investments in learning how to drive ensure that the monopoly regime of driving on a given side of the road will be stable for a long time period.
Likewise, an airline which uses only one model of aircraft saves on parts inventory, maintenance, fleet size, scheduling, and staff training, etc. A university IT department that allows only one model, language or software suite also saves money. A university that requires all applicants to take a Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) saves much effort in evaluating the applications of students coming from diverse school systems. Further, many universities asking for the SAT tests yield economies of scale in devising and administering the test, and each student has to take the test only once to support applications to multiple schools. A uniform commercial code and a system of weights and measures lower the cost of transactions and thus promotes commerce. Availability of 110 volt 60
Hz alternating current in homes and offices through a standardized wall adapter cuts the cost of appliances. Giving preference, if not monopoly, to some systems and designs over others is the essential feature of all schemes of standardization (Sunder 1988 and .
However, there are also some costs associated with standardization (Krislov [1997] ). Penalties associated with deviation from a standard discourage innovation. For a monopoly standard, deviation is hardly possible without a mass rebellion which arrives only after a head of steam of resentment against the current regime has been built up. Discovery of better designs and practices is not only discouraged,
it is also made difficult because there are few alternatives for making comparisons. If standards are made a public good, their developers cannot capture any gains from standardization and do not have incentives to develop better standards except as a government body or industry collective.
These features of standards suggest that there should be room for competition among standards.
Most airlines fly multiple models and makes of aircraft, most IT departments support alternative equipment and software, most universities accept SAT as well as some lesser known alternatives, and some industries (cotton and diamonds for example) have their own commercial code. In corporate law, competition among the fifty states of the U.S. prevails. Likewise, there is competition among university accreditation bodies, state and federal bank regulators, stock exchanges, and even provision of single-phase and three-phase electric current providing 110, 207 and 240 volt electricity in U.S.
There are multiple competing standards for cellular phones, data networks, computer operating systems, and how characters are represented by 0-1 bits in computers. All these variations, and thousands of others, are norms instead of being exceptions. They sacrifice certain efficiencies provided by a monopoly for the sake of innovation and development of even better standards.
In U.S., and EU, monopoly financial reporting standards appears to have been chosen almost by default, and with little known debate on the merits of monopoly and competition in this domain.
The FASB often decides on such standards by a mere 4-to-3 simple majority vote (See Seidler [1990] for a complaint about lack of consensus in FASB decision making). As seen in Table 4 , the four engineering standard setters use higher thresholds of support, even though none of their standards enjoy the monopoly status of financial reporting standards. Seidler ([1990] ) wonders how any corporation could function if its board often had 4:3 votes and no clearly defined factions on the board.
Quality and Coordination Standards in the Public Sector
In order to get some data on co-ordination and quality standards we visited the websites of 80
Federal Government departments who were listed as having a standard setting function in the most recent edition of a U.S. Government publication of "Standards Activities of Organizations in the United States" (Toth 1996b) . We recorded a brief summary of the type of standards being set by each agency (e.g., the Department of Agriculture sets standards for food and farm products including tobacco). The Toth ([1996b] ) study provided data on: (1) Whether standards set by each agency were voluntary or mandatory for external users, (2) Whether the agency audits (certifies) entities who are governed by their standards, and (3) Whether the agency sets standards in-house or adopts private sector standards.
We also visited the website of each of these 80 Federal Government Agencies and attempted to find and download electronic copies of their standards. We were able to access copies of the standards for 64 Federal Government Agencies (80% of the sample). We examined the websites and/or the standards to determine whether the agency provides a minimum standard (Pass/Fail) or a series of grades (e.g., U.S. Prime Beef). We also coded the standard as to whether it was a quality standard or a co-ordination standard (in accordance with the definitions provided in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). We coded each agency in terms of whether its standards were economic (e.g., standards on weight and measures), scientific (e.g., meteorology / weather standards) or social/health related (e.g., standards for meat and poultry). Results are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that thirty nine federal government agencies (61%) set quality standards versus twenty five federal agencies (39%) set co-ordination standards. Thus government agencies are marginally more likely to set quality standards ((χ 2 = 3.06, p <0.08). Federal government agencies who set quality standards are more likely to conduct an audit (or certification) of users (done by 30/39 agencies (77%)) whereas federal agencies who set co-ordination standards are less likely to conduct audits (done by only 7/25 agencies (28%); χ 2 = 7.08, p <0.01). Agencies who set quality standards are also marginally more likely to adopt private sector input in setting standards (adopted by 28/39 federal agencies (72%)) than agencies who set co-ordination standards (done by 14/25 agencies (56%); χ 2 = 3.32, p <0.07). This result is driven primarily by the tendency of agencies setting scientific related standards to rely heavily on private standard setting organizations. As mentioned earlier, there is also a policy directive in the federal government to increase reliance on private standard setters in all areas of regulation (Toth [1996a] ). In Canada the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) which is a government body that oversees standard setting activity, also has an explicit preference for standard setting to be done in the private sector.
Accounting standards are set in the private sector, but have some attributes normally found in government departments who set quality standards such as external audit and the participation of private entities in the standard setting process. This raises a question as to whether accounting standards are quality standards, co-ordination standards or a hybrid of the two and whether they should be set in the public or private sector.
Arguments made for accounting standards include elements of both quality as well as coordination. Disclosure standards tend to be regarded as pertaining to quality, with more disclosure being identified with higher quality financial reporting (Diamond and Verrechia [1991] , Leuz and Verrechia [2000] ). On the other hand, measurement standards, to the extent they are justified by the demand for comparability of financial statements, tend to be regarded as coordination standards (Sunder 1988) . Their value arises more from the use of the same measurement method across firms, industries and economies and not so much from the specific method of measurement incorporated in the standard.
Such classification of disclosure and measurement standards as quality and coordination standards is approximate at best and should be used with considerable care. The quality of financial reporting is not monotonic in the extent or detail of disclosure for at least two reasons. First, it is possible for a reporting entity to disclose information at such a detailed (fine) level as to make it difficult for nonexperts, or even experts with scarce time and computational ability to understand the disclosure (too much disclosure can inhibit transparency). Enron, for example, disclosed in its financial statements information about some 3,000 special purpose entities. This magnitude of disclosure made it difficult for readers to understand the financial condition of Enron. Second, as Arya et al., ([2003]) show, greater transparency of reporting is not strictly better for shareholders (see Verrechia [1983] for a similar argument about proprietary costs associated with increased transparency). Subject to these reservations, we shall proceed by assuming that disclosure standards can generally be regarded as quality standards.
The actual practice of accounting is quite odd in its treatment of measurement issues versus disclosure issues. Measurement issues (which we have classified as being coordination standards justified by consistency and comparability) are the subject of extensive discussion and debate, subject to mandatory audit, and the cause of re-statements and SEC enforcement actions. Disclosure issues (which we have classified as quality standards), on the other hand are subject to much less regulatorydebate, are only partly audited and more loosely audited 6 , and are usually not the cause of restatements and SEC enforcement actions. It is common in accounting debates to assert that good disclosure cannot compensate for inadequacies in accounting measurement (Schipper [2007] ). The whole debate about inadequacies of lease accounting (FAS 13) can only be rational if the good and very extensive disclosure associated with classification of a transaction as an operating lease is considered to be inferior to measurement of the lease as debt on the balance sheet. Recent attempts to reform lease accounting (such as the G4+1 report -see Jamal and Tan [2007] ) so that all leases get reported on the balance sheet indicates that both FASB and IASB are very concerned with measurement rather than disclosure. Likewise IASB has recently decreed that LIFO will not be considered an appropriate basis of inventory valuation (IASB [2005] ).
Are measurement issues really co-ordination standards or quality standards? Can the conceptual framework help us to determine whether LIFO is a better or inferior method of inventory valuation vis a vis FIFO? Can the conceptual framework help determine whether goodwill should be reported on the balance sheet and never adjusted, amortized over 20 or 40 years, subject to an impairment test or immediately written off against shareholders equity (or comprehensive income)? It appears that many measurement issues in accounting debates are arbitrary choices (i.e., coordination standards) that cannot be rank ordered, especially not by reference to the conceptual framework (Joyce, Libby and Sunder ([1982] ). Some thought needs to be given to whether any measurement standards can be justified as being better than their alternatives, and what the basis for determining better is in accounting measurement.
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6 Disclosures in the financial statements are subject to audit though there is some evidence that they receive less audit scrutiny (Libby, Nelson and Hunton [2006] ). Much disclosure also occurs in venues like the MD&A which is not covered by the auditors report, though is subject to audit review for consistency with the financial statements. Managers are also given much more flexibility in generating disclosure, especially in MD&A where they can report from the perspective of management. Measurement standards are much more prescriptive.
Comparison of Standard Setting Processes
It is quite common in the economy to have competing SSOs whose jurisdiction overlaps (see Jamal, Maier and Sunder [2003] ). We examine the processes used by four SSOs whose standard setting domain partially overlaps, especially with relation to internet telephony (which is the subject of a case study in Section 4 of this paper Nickerson and Muehlen ([2005] ). Table 4 presents a comparison of the standard setting process of these four SSOs and FASB. All of these SSOs have elaborate processes for initiating standards, engaging a diverse set of participants and various quality control and editorial processes. We make the following comparative observations from Table 4 :
Number of Standards: Consistent with results reported previously, the FASB has the least number of standards (159 standards and 12 working groups) of the five SSOs, whereas the IETF has the largest (4,500 standards and 124 working groups).
Government Participation and Sanctions:
This runs the gamut from complete government dominance (e.g., ITU) to no government involvement (e.g., IETF). IEEE and ATIS exhibit a mix of government and private involvement in standard setting, as does the FASB. FASB is the only body whose standards are formally backed by law. FASB is also the only SSO whose standards are subject to mandatory audit and formal government sanctions for non compliance. IEEE has a provision for obtaining voluntary certification of standards compliance, whereas there is no formal certification or sanctions process for the other three SSOs. In accounting, mandatory audit requirement and enforcement are considered to be necessary for the proper functioning of accounting standards (e.g., Ball et al [2003] ; Bushman and Piotroski [2006] ). It is not the norm in the economy for standards to be enforced by government sanctions (even for quality standards) and there is little evidence that compliance with accounting standards is any better than compliance with standards set in other parts of the economy not enforced by law (see also Jamal, Maier and Sunder [2005] ).
Financing:
The FASB is financed primarily from a tax levied on publicly traded companies. This tax authority comes from SOX. All the other SSOs rely primarily on fees levied on entities (individuals, companies or governments) who are direct participants in the standard setting process. The FASB also relies on publication sales for a significant part of its budget (33 percent), whereas SSOs like IETF provide all their standards publicly on the internet with no fee and no publication related revenue; they are financed primarily by membership dues and volunteers.
Standards Adoption Threshold: FASB and ATIS use a simple majority threshold for adopting a standard, ITU requires 70 percent, IEEE has a 75 percent threshold, and IETF has no formal voting, just a process to ascertain "rough consensus." IEEE has two distinctive elements as compared to the other SSOs namely, potential for a company to capture a standard setting committee by stacking its membership, and a 5 year sunset clause that cause all standards to face an automatic review or lapse.
Standards Competition: FASB is the only SSO which has no provision for standards competition and does not allow issuance of more than one standard for a particular issue. All the other four technology related SSOs allow the possibility of more than one competing standard to be adopted by the SSO. In addition, the standards of these four SSOs also compete with each other (see Section 4 for a case study of such competition across SSOs). IEEE and ATIS sponsor periodic Olympic type competitions where sponsors bring their products and take part in a competition where the winner becomes the standard.
IETF requires two independent practical operationalizations to be developed for each proposed standard before a standard can be adopted. FASB is the only SSO which has no routine field testing of standards prior to their adoption.
In 
Competition in Standard Setting
Each industry in the U.S., from aerospace to wood products, is subject to standards set by multiple sets of government, domestic private and international SSOs (see Figure 4) . Some industries (e.g., construction and fire safety) have to comply with standards set by over 100 government and private SSOs. The data in Figure 4 show that the existence of multiple (government, private, and international) standard setting bodies is the norm in the economy. An argument could be made that accounting also has a myriad of competing SSOs. In the U.S. we have the FASB, but also the government accounting standards board (GASB), the AICPA, the SEC, various state accounting boards, treasury associations and industry specific accounting pronouncements, research studies and a host of other sources of guidance (standards) on GAAP. Likewise there are national accounting SSOs in a variety of countries as well as the IASB. The attempt to set up one dominant global accounting standard setter (e.g., see Dye and Sunder [2001] , Sunder [2002] ) is also not unusual given similar debates in many other areas of the economy (e.g., chemicals, textiles).
What is unusual in accounting is the development of a GAAP hierarchy (SAS 69). SAS 69
mandates a hierarchy of GAAP sources with written FASB pronouncements at the top of the hierarchy.
In countries like Canada, which have previously had a "professional judgment override" to allow professional judgment, imposition of a GAAP hierarchy (in Section 1100 of the CICA Handbook) was explicitly linked to removing the professional judgment override (Jamal and Tan [2007] ). Accounting, tax and the law seem to be the only domains where a hierarchy of authoritative sources is specified in writing, and enforced by mandate. We are not aware of any other area in the economy where a hierarchy of authority is mandated and enforced by law.
Case Study of Internet Telephony
"The internet is the service" -Jon Peterson (area director of IETF)
The conventional telephone provides global connectivity to users. Anyone with a phone can dial a number and reach anyone on the planet who has a phone and increasingly even a computer. This need for connectivity indicates that the main value of a telephone comes from the network to which it is attached. The need for inter-connectivity also makes telephone systems very complex. The Despite investments of billions of dollars by telephone companies in building safe and reliable PSTN circuit switched network, telephone services are rapidly migrating to the internet, and using standards developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) which are packet based as opposed to circuit based. In contrast with circuit switched networks, packet switched networks neither create nor maintain a circuit path between terminals. Instead, the data transmitted is divided into small packets and each packet moves independently from origin to termination before being reassembled and presented to the recipient as an integrated message. The case study seeks to explore how a standard setting body with no government backing, and no ability to coerce users to use its standards (no threat of sanctions) came to dominate the telephone industry and induced its migration towards the internet.
Background Circuit Switched Network Telephone Model
The PSTN network features a circuit switched architecture (Goralski and Kolon. [2000] ITU's standard setting process is divided into three sub-sectors with the telecommunication sector (ITU-T) being responsible for setting international networking standards including asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) and integrated service digital network (ISDN). ITU standards are designated by a letter, followed by a number. Each letter designates a specific area of technology. For example, the letter H deals with audiovisual and multimedia systems including voice over internet protocol (VOIP).
In order to support such a variety of media types, an H.323 system may consist of several different components:
• Terminals: a network endpoint (e.g., a phone) which may provide audio, video, or data communications with another terminal.
• Gateways: Provides connections for call setup, control and media coding which provides access to terminals on a circuit switched network (such as the PSTN).
• Gatekeepers: a network function that provides address translation, access control, bandwidth management, and other management operations for a network.
• Multipoint Control Units: a network function that enables tele-conferencing.
H.323 is a meta standard 7 under which the various VOIP standards fit rather than a specific standard (Goralski and Kolon, [2000] ). All it requires is a packet based network interface. Given that the standard was set by committee T (which also has responsibility for circuit switched ISDN and ATM networks) it is not surprising that the standard was designed for LAN type environments, public X.25 type packet networks, and layer ATM networks with a circuit switched network. The migration of telephony to the internet means very little traffic now goes over the type of networks H.323 was originally designed for. H.323 was designed for audio communications, as well as video applications (e.g., teleconferencing) and data conferencing(e.g., file transfer). H.323 was also tightly coupled with other telecommunication standards issued by ITU-T. (call signalling protocols and media stream packetization for packet based multimedia communications systems), and H.245 which processes non telephone signals and is used to negotiate channel usage and capabilities. H.225 also covers a much wider range of applications than just audio. H.225 (and H.245) are used to establish and terminate calls.
Packet-Switched Network: The Competing Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Model
The session initiation protocol (SIP) was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). For many years, the IETF proposed to ITU-T that the underlying web protocol TCP/IP should be adopted as an international standard. However, the ITU-T was wedded to a circuit switched and (5) There is no single point of failure, transparency of applications and complete control by users over applications and selection of services.
The circuit switched network made a high quality telephone system with global connectivity possible. However, SIP seems to be a robust packet-switched challenger which is not wedded to a circuit switched environment. The web orientation of SIP enables a much broader range of functions including multi-player games, bank transactions, mobility, yet keeping the simplicity, scalability and extensibility principles as well as ease of programming and debugging.
Signalling Protocols for Session Initialization Protocol (SIP)
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signalling protocol used for establishing and controlling multimedia communication sessions (e.g., a phone call or a videoconference) on networks that use the Internet Protocol (IP). SIP was primarily designed to establish, modify, and terminate sessions, and therefore has no information about the details within a session. This simplicity makes SIP quite scalable and extensible, and it can be used easily in different architectures and deployment scenarios. SIP is modeled after the simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) used for e-mail, and the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), the protocol that runs the web. SIP uses much of the architecture of HTTP making it easier to code and debug. SIP relies on the Session Description Protocol (SDP -which is also an IETF standard) to carry out a control function similar to H.245. SDP also interfaces with the Real Time Signaling Protocol (RTSP) to negotiate channel usage.
The SIP architecture defines two main devices: clients and servers 8 . A client is described in RFC 3261 as a network element (e.g., a SIP phone) that sends SIP requests and receives SIP responses.
Similarly, the server is a network element that receives requests in order to service them, and then responds to those requests. Thus, the foundation of well-known and extensively implemented Internet protocols, such as HTTP, plus the client/server architecture, provides SIP with a degree of simplicity that many feel is superior to the complexities found in H.323. This client/server operation, modeled on the HTTP request/response paradigm, is one of the major strong suits of SIP. The control function of SIP (using the SDP protocol) appears similar to that of H.323 but is fact much simpler to implement because no central server is required to set up a session. For example, the calling party would send an INVITE message to the called party to initiate the session, who would respond with Ringing and OK messages. The calling party would then return an ACK (acknowledgement) message, which would complete the connection, and allow information to be exchanged between the two parties. When the connection is no longer required, one party sends a BYE message, with an OK message returned in response, thus terminating the call.
SIP is seen by some experts as being equivalent in functionality to H.323 (e.g., Goralski and Kolon, [2000] ). However, others see SIP as having several significant advantages such as less cost, less complexity (simplicity), less need for memory and processing capacity, and more scalability, extensibility and modularity (Schulzrinne and Rosenberg [1998a, b] ). A further advantage of SIP is that the IETF is more nimble than ITU-T as a standard setting organization and doesn't have to go through a slow and deliberate process to seek complete consensus that ITU as a quasi government organization has to do. IETF can focus more on technical elegance and less on politics.
26
What is clear is that SIP is based on a completely different (web based) architecture; it is not just an extension of a circuit switch network. What is also clear is that SIP has helped move the entire telephony industry towards the web. As the effect of legacy PSTN networks weakens with time, it is a fairly safe prediction that in the future all telephony will run on the web (or its future re-incarnation)
and not on circuit switched networks.
The Benefit of Competing Standard Setting Bodies
The ITU-T standard setting body has developed a good track record of setting international standards using a framework where a new standard is defined for each feature, and then a set of features are integrated into a meta-standard like H.323. This creates a complex framework where addition of each new feature requires adjusting the definition and operation of all existing features.
Despite these complexities, the ITU-T standardization body has been an effective global standard setter who responded on a timely basis to changes in technology over many decades. The PSTN developed and assisted by ITU-T standards is widely regarded (even by its critics) as being reliable, providing good voice quality, minimal delay and worldwide coverage.
Yet it turns out a better alternative was available, but not pursued by ITU-T. Given its historical legacy (and billions of dollars invested in the existing system by telecom companies), it is highly doubtful that ITU-T and the telecom industry would have ever made the leap to an internet infrastructure without the presence, competitive pressure and insight of IETF. The shift of telephony to the internet is not an isolated process. It builds on an internet standards infrastructure developed over many years by IETF. In the absence of this standards infrastructure, it would not have been possible to migrate the telecom industry to the internet.
The IETF pursued internet telephony as a matter of ideology with a commitment to using the internet and its emphasis on having the control reside at the end points instead of at a central server.
SIP defines primitives that a system can support instead of features (as in H.323). This focus on features (and being content neutral) makes it easy for SIP to add new features and new devices (not just phones). This philosophy of no central control appears to be very powerful as telephony increasingly is being driven by P2P networks (e.g, skype, google talk). The use of the internet helps with simplicity, scalability, better able to use intelligent devices and deal with presence, mobility, P2P
and instant messaging. Many of these new services were not even envisioned when a small number of researchers involved with IETF began to develop protocols for routing telephone calls over the internet. There is also the added advantage of low cost. Under a traditional intelligent phone network, only the phone company could add new features, and upgrading the (intelligent) network was slow and costly. In a distributed internet environment, it is much easier to add new services without needing to upgrade the entire network. The attitude and success of IETF is the exact opposite of the FASB. The FASB (Like ITU-T) is wedded to a centralized, control and command type of standard setting model.
At present, we have a legacy PSTN circuit switched telephone system based on centralized control, co-existing with an internet (packet) based de-centralized system. All indications are that the future belongs on the internet, and not in centrally controlled circuit switched networks. The presence of ideologically competing SSOs has been a key requirement for creating competing sets of telephony standards. The presence of competing SSOs has been a key factor in leading the development of this transformational technology.
Discussion and Implications for Accounting Standard Setting
The broad survey of standard setting practices in the U.S. economy presented in this paper raises several important issues regarding accounting standard setting. First, most industries have multiple competing SSOs with overlapping jurisdictions (see Figure 4 , Table 4 and the case study in Section 4). A monopoly in standard setting may exist in some domains, but it is not the general rule.
While we cannot rule out the possibility that there exist valid arguments for allowing a monopoly SSO for accounting, such arguments remain to be made, analyzed and defended.
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The FASB is pursuing a convergence project with IASB in order to eliminate what little diversity and competition survives in accounting standard setting. The oft-repeated argument for monopoly and convergence is uniformity and comparability of financial statements across companies (and countries). This is a co-ordination (and not a quality) argument. For the industries listed in Figure   4 , co-ordination demand for standards would hardly appear to be less than co-ordination demand in
accounting. Yet most industries, including financial industries 9 flourish with multiple standards. It is often feared that competition among accounting standards will start a race to the bottom and degrade the quality of financial reporting (Dye and Sunder [2001] , Sunder [2002] ). With pervasive evidence of standards competition in all parts of the economy (see also Jamal, Maier and Sunder, [2003] ), this fear appears to be misplaced unless better theory or evidence to the contrary can be developed.
A government backed monopoly must at least appear to be responsive to demands of various constituencies and thus adopt an elaborate due process method that slows down standard setting (Cheit [1990] ). FASB has an elaborate due process model, and the appearance of engaging diverse constituencies but little actual participation from preparers, auditors and users of financial statements.
We have lost the notion of "generally accepted" in accounting. The level of engagement of the engineering community in standard setting that we document in the voluntary participation in IETF standard setting groups, is inconceivable in accounting today.
Competing private standard setters have incentives to be innovative and to carve out a clientele rather than trying to please all constituencies (see Jamal, Maier and Sunder, [2003] for an example in e-commerce privacy). Monopolies are seldom known to be innovative. Especially when backed by government they are slow in responding to changes in the environment due to extensive due process requirements. The data on standard setting in the private sector suggests that FASB is too reticent, rather than too prolific in setting standards. This lack of responsiveness and timeliness is especially 29 troubling in accounting where a financial engineering industry creates transactions and structures to evade the substance of accounting standards (e.g., the structuring of leases, preferred shares and special purpose entities). For example, in the case of lease accounting, a G4+1 country 10 group study issued a report (Nailor and Leonard [2000] ) in response to concerns about abuse of the lease accounting standard (FAS 13). The G4+1 report recommended a change in the leasing standard whereby all leases should be reported on the balance sheet (with no tests or bright lines). Yet seven years later in fall of 2007 there has still been no new lease standard and the FASB and IASB are still studying the recommendations of the G4+1 report. A competing set of accounting standard setters are likely to be more responsive to changes in financial engineering, and respond more quickly to abuses in implementation of the standards set. Despite intense regulatory pressure after the Enron scandal (and legal reforms such as SOX), a large amount of corporate debt continues to be reported off balance sheet due to loopholes in the lease accounting rules.
The current accounting standard setter (FASB) does not have to be doing poorly in order to develop a case for allowing regulatory competition in accounting. By most accounts the subject of the case study in Section 4 (the ITU) has been a highly successful and good standard setter. The ITU's standards had created a reliable and global telephone system. By many measures it was a great success.
The ITU had 191 fee paying countries as members (good global participation), a long history (formed in 1863), high quality standards (you could get a good voice phone reception all over the world), and a reliable technology that responded to changes in the environment (the circuit switched network, and the ISDN network for internet and high speed access).
Yet it turned out that an alternative (packet switched) architecture was possible with lower cost and easier integration with the internet, instant messaging and peer to peer communities and models.
The switch in the telecom industry from a circuit switched network to a packet switched network was 30 10 The G4+1 Group are the accounting standard setting bodies of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States. The IASB was an observer in this process.
facilitated by the presence of a competing standard setter (IETF) that had no official government support, no threat of sanctions, and no ability to compel companies to use its standards. The IETF was successful because it had a different model for conceiving of network communication services, not because it was trying to harmonize with the ITU's model of telephone services. The simpler decentralized protocol for network communications has made proliferation of new internet devices and services which were not even conceived of by those who developed the new system. This begs the question why must there be only one model (or only one conceptual framework) for development of accounting standards? While some regulatory oversight over accounting standard setting might be desirable, the current approach of relying on a monopoly and pursuing harmonization of accounting standards appears to have little support in theory or empirical evidence. Some rethinking of this approach might be warranted. 1900-1909 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1996 
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